Economic development and authoritarianism by List-Jensen, Ann Sasa
   
 
Aalborg Universitet
Economic Development and Authoritarianism
List-Jensen, Ann Sasa
Publication date:
2008
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
List-Jensen, A. S. (2008). Economic Development and Authoritarianism: A Case Study on the Korean
Developmental State. Aalborg University: Department of History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg
University.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: January 15, 2017
  
 
 
DIIPER 
Development, Innovation and 
International Political  
Economy Research 
Aalborg University 
Fibigerstraede 2-8a 
DK-9220 Aalborg East 
Phone: +45 9940 9813 
Fax:     +45 9635 0044 
Mail: diiper@lists.ihis.aau.dk 
DIIPER RESEARCH SERIES 
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 5
 
 
 
ISSN: 1902-8679 
Economic Development and 
Authoritarianism
 
A Case Study on the Korean 
Developmental State
Ann Sasa List-Jensen
 
©  2008 Ann Sasa List-Jensen 
Economic Development and Authoritarianism - A Case Study on the Korean 
Developmental State  
 Development, Innovation and International Political Economy Research (DIIPER) 
 Aalborg University 
 Denmark  
 DIIPER Research Series 
 Working Paper No. 5 
 
 
ISSN 1902-8679 
 
 
Published by 
DIIPER & Department of History, International and Social Studies 
Aalborg University 
 
 
Distribution 
Download as PDF on 
http://www.diiper.ihis.dk/ 
 
 
Lay-out and word processing 
Cirkeline Kappel 
 
 
The Secretariat 
Development, Innovation and International Political Economy Research 
Fibigerstraede 2, room 99 
Aalborg University 
DK-9220 Aalborg East  
Denmark 
Tel.  + 45 9940 8310 
Fax. + 45 9635 0044 
 
 
E-mail: diiper@lists.ihis.aau.dk 
Homepage: http://www.diiper.ihis.dk/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Economic Development and Authoritarianism 
A Case Study on the Korean Developmental State  
 
Ann Sasa List-Jensen1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Only a few decades ago, South Korea was not better than any other Third World 
countries, in terms of economic and human records.2 But today South Korea, 
along with several other countries in East Asia, has become the object of 
academic and political attention for achieving two rabbits at the same time; 
economic development and democracy. Today, when many other states – both 
catching-up Southeast Asian economies and former-socialist countries – search 
for a model of economic success and political opening, the debate on the Korean 
model becomes of even greater political relevance.  South Korea, for sure, 
provides a vast source of inquiry and research on the link between economic 
performance and regime type. Korean economy recorded miraculous growth for 
the past thirty years under authoritarian rule. In 1987, people’s power forced 
authoritarian regime to compromise in restoring political competition. Most 
writings are, however, based on the assumption that authoritarianism is more or 
less inevitable for economic success, and in order to enjoy democratic political 
setting people have to wait until a certain level of material progress is achieved 
(Lipset 1959; Johnson 1982a, 1982b). Only a few critical studies of the Korean 
economic development experience seem to have focused on the incalculable 
human costs and the sacrifice of human values such as social justice, human 
rights, and environmental safety, under the banner of rapid growth (Kim 2001; 
Kang 2003; Choi 2005). 
 
The Korean experience raises two major questions: Is democratic development 
an evolutionary phenomenon resulting from economic development, as 
modernization theorists have argued? Is authoritarianism more effective and 
desirable in achieving developmental goals? In search for the answers, this paper 
first examines contending theories on the relationship between economic 
development and democracy, and then analyses the Korean developmental 
model to see the link between economic performance and regime type. From 
theory assessment, modernization argument seems to be relevant on the point 
that economic growth brings together changes in the overall socio-economic 
                                                          
1  Ann Sasa List-Jensen is externally affiliated with DIIPER. This revised and updated working paper was 
presented at DIIPER's research seminar in January, 2008. 
2  When a student demonstration brought down the corrupt Syngman Rhee government in April 1960, South 
Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Its 1960 gross domestic product per capita was lower 
than that of some sub-Saharan African and most Latin American countries, as well as many of its Asian 
neighbors (Kim and Lim 2007: 73). 
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structure of society and the forces emerging from this transformation favor 
democratic governance. For this, the second section of this paper examines 
contending theories on the relationship of development and democracy; 
modernization theory and its critics and developmental state paradigm theory are 
included. The third section carries out an empirical assessment of the Korean 
developmental experience by looking at the exogenous factors and the relevance 
of developmental statist argument. Then, the paper will try to clarify how 
economic development and regime type have been associated in the Korean 
economic development experience. The fourth section is briefly going to discuss 
the policy implications of the financial crisis in 1997 and the neoliberal turn 
which subsequently have followed and how the neoliberal reforms seem to have 
transformed the Korean developmental state model. The final section is a 
conclusion which summarizes the major findings of this study. 
 
 
II. Economic Development and Developmental State: Literature Review 
 
2. Definition: Economic Development 
As any definition of a term, the term development is understood as diversely as 
the numbers of scholars. In the broadest sense, development means, as Gandhi 
believed, a process reducing absolute poverty and inequality and achieving full 
realization of the human potential (Pourgerami 1991: 1). From an institutionalist 
approach, Myrdal makes a distinction between growth and development by 
explaining that development consists of growth – a rise in national or per-capita 
real income and product – plus gradual and sustained improvements in the social 
system and institutional arrangement (Pourgerami 1991: 29). For the purpose of 
this study we adopt Goldstein’s definition of economic development: “The 
combined process of capital accumulation, rising per capita incomes (with 
consequent falling birthrates), the increasing of skills in the population, the 
adoption of new technological styles, and other related social and economic 
changes” (Goldstein 2006: 577). The paper also uses terms such as economic 
development and capitalist development, which are basically identical with the 
meaning of development.  
 
2. Theory Assessment 
2.1. Does Economic Development Lead to Democracy? 
Modernization Theory and Its Critics 
Modernization theory emerged in the 1950s when a wave of democratization 
was sweeping the globe, so the scholars could be optimistic about the future of 
democracy in newly emancipating states, perceiving it as a form of government 
that would evolve ultimately from the process of economic development and 
modernization. These new democracies, however, failed to maintain stability 
and vacillated between democratic and authoritarian regimes. It was, then, 
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theories of dependency and bureaucratic authoritarianism that emerged and 
sought to explain the retreat of democracy. The essential claim of modernization 
theory is that democratic development is an evolutionary phenomenon and a 
concomitant of modernity, hence, democracy is an outcome of socioeconomic 
development, not a condition of it (Leftwich 1996: 7). Historical studies, in 
which the theory finds much evidence, suggest that modern democracies can 
occur only under certain conditions of capitalist industrialization. It was Seymor 
M. Lipset who theorized the modernization thesis in the 1950s (Lipset 1959; 
Lipset and Smelser 1966). To put it simple: the more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater the chances that it will become and sustain democracy. His emphasis 
was placed on the socioeconomic characteristics of societies as causal factors of 
democratization. Based on cross-national quantitative comparative research, he 
suggested a positive linear relationship between levels of socioeconomic 
development and democratic development. His point was that “economic 
development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational 
standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic 
condition sustaining democracy, and it is a mark of efficiency of the total system 
(Lipset 1959: 76-79). This modernization view holds that many parts of what 
used to be call the “underdeveloped”, “backward” or colonial world were not 
ready for democracy and that a considerable amount of economic and social 
progress, plus political tutelage, was required before the institutions and 
processes of democracy would stick (Lipset 1959, 1960).  
 
Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueshemeyer and John D. Stephens also manifest that 
capitalist development in general helps the rise of democracy by transforming 
the class structure (Rueshemeyer et al.1992: 86). Assuming that democracy is a 
matter of power and power sharing, they focus on three clusters of primarily 
relevance for the changes of democracy; class power; state power; and 
transnational structures of power (Ibid: 73-75). These three factors combined 
and interacted in varying ways and varying sequences to determine political 
developments. The organized working class appeared as a key actor in the 
development of full democracy and even in restricted democracy as well. 
However, since the working class nowhere was strong enough to push through 
democracy alone, it was the middle-classes that assumed a pivotal role in the 
development of democracy (Ibid: 272). Thus, capitalist development is related to 
democracy in the sense that it shifts the balance of power, because it weakens 
the power of the landlord class and strengthens subordinate classes. The working 
and middle-classes gain unprecedented capacity for self-organization, due to 
such developments as urbanization, factory production, and new forms of 
communication and transportation. But the posture of one class can never be 
understood in isolation from that of all other classes, states and international 
actors in the historical situation. What is important to note here is that it is not 
the mere rise in per capita income that is of greatest importance regarding the 
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impact of economic development on democracy, but rather the changes in the 
class and social structure caused by industrialization and urbanization are most 
consequential for democracy. The dynamics of the correlation between levels of 
economic development and democracy suggests that economic growth tends to 
produce social mobilization which in turn tends to mobilize political 
participation and hence, regime change. In other words, in the low income 
countries the state often holds on to power as long as it can, while when they 
reach high levels of growth the balance between state and society begins to tilt 
in the direction of society, ultimately giving rise to pressures for transition 
towards more democratic political systems. 
 
However, modernization theorists had a hard time accounting for the growing 
inequalities and authoritarian governance in Third World countries and for 
increasing international inequality. Their assumption of a positive correlation 
between capitalist development and democratization failed to anticipate the 
“new authoritarianism” that swept through the relatively industrialized Latin 
American countries, nor could it account for the economically successful 
authoritarian capitalism that persisted for long periods of time in East Asia. 
Thus, some scholars began to look beyond the national boundaries of political 
economy to the structure of the international system (theories of dependence), 
while others emphasized bureaucratic authoritarianism as causal explanations 
for economic development.  
 
2.2. Authoritarian Developmental Paradigm  
From the mid-1980s onwards, a new body of literature emerged which argued 
that the economic performance of the “late industrializers” in East Asia was, in 
fact, largely attributable to government intervention and the synergistic 
relationship between the state and the private sector (Johnson 1982a, 1982b; 
Zysman 1983; Deyo et al. 1987; White et al. 1988; Amsden 1989).  In 1982, 
Chalmers Johnson published the book MITI and the Japanese Miracle, and 
hence, became the pioneer in the future debates over the role of the state in 
industrialization. He argued that Japan’s “developmental state” was a central 
element in explaining the country’s post-World War II “economic miracle” and 
by doing so, he was coining a third category “developmental state” alongside 
liberal and Stalinist conceptions (Johnson 1982b). This was a key breakthrough 
in the American literature on Northeast Asia.3 Along with another virtue of 
Johnson’s work is to place the analysis of ideology and culture in the historical 
context of late development and economic nationalism. In line with Johnson’s 
argument, authoritarian developmental states are defined as strong state regimes 
                                                          
3  The book is perhaps best known for the trichotomy of states that are “plan rational” (Japan), “plan 
ideological (Stalinist states), and “regulatory” (the New Deal American state). The new in this analysis is 
to suggest that planning can be as “rational” as market allocation (Cumings 1987: 47). 
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engaged in facilitating fast capitalist growth. Their political form is 
characterized by centralized power structure and a strong drive to eliminate or 
subordinate all potential centers of countervailing power. The reasons provided 
why they might be a necessary condition for economic development, at least at a 
relatively early stage, are as follows: 
 
1) Suppression of consumption and effective mass mobilization for 
industrialization: An authoritarian regime is better able to regiment a population 
for the massive sacrifices necessary for early industrialization (Johnson 1987: 
145), including keeping industrial wages very low, extracting large surpluses of 
labor from the countryside to feed a growing urban industrial work force, and 
conducting large-scale literacy and public health campaigns among people who 
still lack the requisite habits and attitudes for successful economic development 
(Word Bank 1996; Shin and Chang 2003; Kang 2003). 
 
2) Technocratic rationality: An authoritarian regime can be more efficient in 
achieving the goals of the initial stages of industrialization, such as development 
of a solid infrastructure, large amounts of capital, great volumes of imported 
technology, and selection and expansion of the industrial base producing 
relatively simple manufactures at low prices (Deyo 1987; Yun 2003; Pirie 2005, 
2007). 
 
3) Insulation from pressures by different social interests and policy consistency: 
an authoritarian regime can reduce policy fluctuations by insulating itself from 
pressures of various interests groups and avoid critical influence of an electoral 
cycle. Thus, consistent policy will be more credible to economic agents and 
increased policy credibility will improve economic outcomes (Shin and Chang 
2003; Lee and Han 2006).4 
 
4) Developmental ideology: An authoritarian regime can forge or impose a 
national ideology for hard work and sacrifice for economic development.5 Such 
regimes stress the moral claims of the state: national discipline, national unity, 
the importance of stability for national development and the mischievousness 
and decisiveness of politics. “To overcome our backwardness and catch up with 
the advanced countries” becomes the major catch phrase of authoritarian 
developmental states (Johnson 1999; Kim 2001; Kang 2003; Kim 2003). 
 
                                                          
4  For a thorough discussion on the importance of an insulated bureaucracy see: Evans 1995: 51-54 and Weiss 
1998: 49-59.  
5  Chalmers Johnson claims that the source of authority in the developmental state is not one of Weber’s 
traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic sources of authority. It is rather, revolutionary authority of a 
people committed to the transformation of their social, political, or economic order. Legitimation occurs 
from the state’s achievements, not from the way it came to power (Johnson 1999: 53). 
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However, not all authoritarian regimes succeed in economic development (see 
Table 2.1). The most difficult question is, then, why some authoritarian regimes 
successfully promote industrial catch-up while others do not. Also the question 
remains if it necessarily has to be an authoritarian regime. 
 
Table 2.1  
Average Annual Rates of GNP per Capita Growth in Democratic and Non-democratic 
Regimes: 1965-1990 (%) 
Democratic Regimes Non-democratic Regimes 
Jamaica  -1.3 Zaire -2.2 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
  0.0 Nigeria   0.1 
Venezuela -0.1 Zambia -1.9 
Senegal -0.6 Libya -3.0 
India  1.9 South Korea   7.1 
Sri Lanka  2.9 Taiwan   7.0 
Malaysia  4.0 Indonesia   4.5 
Costa Rica  1.4 Brazil   3.3 
Botswana  8.4 China   5.8 
Mauritius  3.2 Algeria   2.4 
Singapore  6.5 Thailand   4.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1992 
 
Chalmers Johnson answers, however, the question why such political systems 
normally are authoritarian. According to Johnson, the main reason is to achieve 
political stability and long-term predictability of the system (Johnson 1987: 
143). He, nevertheless, denies any necessary connection between 
authoritarianism and the developmental state, but in spite of this, he 
acknowledges that authoritarianism can solve the main political problem of 
economic development using market forces. Especially, how to mobilize the 
overwhelming majority of the population to work and sacrifice for 
developmental projects. But he draws a distinction between authoritarian rule 
and what he calls true developmental state; in such a setting the bureaucratic 
rulers possess a unique kind of legitimacy that allows them to be much more 
experimental and undoctrinaire than in the typical authoritarian regime: “This is 
the legitimacy that comes from the devotion to a widely believed-in 
revolutionary project” (Johnson 1999: 52). What is required then is not 
necessarily a democratic state, but a developmental state. Without a 
developmental state, democratic or not, no contemporary developing society is 
likely to achieve developmental breakthrough. Successful developmental 
outcomes, both historically and in modern era, seem to have depended less on 
whether regimes have been democratic or not, and more on such factors as 
internal stability; on acceptability in international economic and political 
markets; on positive relations with dominant economies; on the relative 
autonomy of the state in both democratic and non-democratic polities; on sound 
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infrastructure and competent administration; and on low levels of corruption 
(Kihl 2005; Pirie 2005, 2007).  
 
Other scholars, however, have pointed out the in-built weakness of operating 
with a strong state-weak state dichotomy; John Zysman claims that the concept 
of a strong state-weak state continuum refers to an abstract capacity, and thus, it 
is not issue-oriented by referring to specific abilities in order to carry out 
particular tasks. He rather prefers to employ a second characteristic of a strong 
state: first, the state’s capacity to deny political access to unwanted groups; and 
second, the ability to select among market operation, and hence, the ability to 
guide the economy (Zysman 1983: 294-298). And furthermore, scholars such as 
Linda Weiss and Peter Evans employ an institutional based approach in their 
search for causal explanations for the successful developmental state. Peter 
Evans introduces the concept of “embedded autonomy” as state autonomy 
embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society. Embedded 
autonomy thus provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation 
and re-negotiation of goals and policies. Embeddedness is notioned to be as 
important as autonomy, since it is through this channel it is possible to link the 
state to particular social groups with whom it shares a joint project of 
transformation. And thus, the secret of the developmental state lies in its 
amalgamated nature (Evans 1995: 59). Linda Weiss presents similarly an 
institutional approach by introducing the arrangement of “Governed 
Interdependence” (GI), it describes a capacity system based on infra-structural 
power in which firms are relieved from bearing the entire burden of four major 
“risks”: 1) raising capital, 2) developing new products and technologies, 3) 
finding new markets, and 4) training skilled engineers and workers. And hence, 
a significant proportion of the costs of upgrading technology, new product 
development, industrial training, market expansion and so forth is shared by, or 
embedded in, a thick network of state-informed (i.e. public-private) institutions. 
So the emphasis is placed on coordination and cooperation between government 
and industry (Weiss 1998: 38, see also Weiss 2000, 2003). Despite Evans and 
Weiss’ strong emphasis on an institutional framework in explaining successful 
developmental state experiences, it, nonetheless, seems as they never leave the 
premise of a strong state (read authoritarian state). In particular, their empirical 
data clearly illustrates that the state is autonomous in choosing industrial 
dialogue partners, and what might be even more crucial to exclude others from 
the agenda. In short, the strong developmental state possesses the veto power by 
outlining the rule of the game to the rest of the players. 
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III. Economic Development and Authoritarianism: Empirical Implications 
of the South Korean Experience  
 
3. Understanding the South Korean Developmental Model 
Since the 1960s when the developmental projects took start, South Korea has 
indeed been transformed from one of the world’s poorest countries into an 
exemplar case of the Newly Industrializing Economics. Its per capita income 
rose from $103 in the early 1960s to $7,435 in 1993, and growth rates, which 
averaged 3.4 per cent per annum during 1954-62, have exceeded over 10 per 
cent per annum since 1965. The expansion of exports also increased from $40.9 
million in 1962 to $76 billion in 1993 (KDI 1995; Cherry 2005). And the 
country joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 
1994. South Korea is currently the world’s twelfth-largest economy and holds 
the fourth-largest foreign reserves. It is one of the top five producers in the 
world of ships, automobiles, electronics, and steel (Stiglitz 1999; Lee and Han 
2006; Kim and Lim 2007: 73). However, this rapid and impressive economic 
growth was matched with repressive dictatorial regimes by Park Chung-hee 
(1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987). Undeniably, economic 
development and democracy before 1987 when democratic opening took place 
were negatively related. Thus it has been an important question if this mixture of 
growth and authoritarianism was an inevitable package. Historical, geopolitical, 
and cultural factors have been cited to explain such economic success under 
centralized political power structure. But most of all, developmental 
dictatorship, which pits economic growth against democracy, has been one of 
the central themes of the political economy in South Korea (Moon and Yang 
2002; Kang 2003; Kihl 2005). 
 
3.1. Exogenous Factors: History/Geopolitics/Culture 
Scholars searching for the answers of the Korean miracle have looked in various 
aspects of Korean society and suggested that historical legacies from the Choson 
Dynasty, the experience of the Japanese colonial rule, the subsequent political 
turmoil including the Korean War and the division of the Korean Peninsula, 
Confucian tradition, and geopolitical situation of South Korea during the Cold 
War era did matter for the establishment of a strong state and its push for 
economic growth (Cumings 1998; Shin and Chang 2003; Lim and Jang 2006; 
Kim and Lim 2007). 
 
War and colonialism as the deep background for the Korean developmental state 
was an idea first employed by Bruce Cumings (1981) in The Origins of the 
Korean War6. In that book he argued that the Japanese created a kind of 
                                                          
6  Johnson also heavily invokes the external parameter as causal explanation for the Japanese economic 
miracle by claiming: “it depended to a large extent on losing a big war to the right people at the right 
time” (Johnson 1999: 40). 
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developmentalism in Korea, and though it was profoundly predatory in character 
it nevertheless, achieved rapid industrial growth; it means that the early 1960s 
was not the first time for such a growth in South Korea (Woo-Cumings 1999: 7). 
Atul Kohli has pointed out that Japanese colonial rule shaped an overloaded 
state structure, from which we can trace the emergence of authoritarian regimes 
afterwards. In particular, some patterns within this overall economic 
transformation have proved to be of long-term significance. First, the colonial 
state preferred to work with large business group. Since the Korean, family-
centered, but gigantic enterprises also came into their own under this regime, 
herein may lay the origin of the chaebols.7 The Korean working class is also said 
to have been originated under Japanese rule. For example, if there were less than 
ten thousand industrial workers in 1910, the population of industrial workers had 
reached 1.3 million in 1943. And furthermore, the moment its origin came into 
being in a very constraint and cohesive colonial environment, it might be a 
causal explanation for future conformity and hence, later optional repression of 
the working class (Kim and Moon 2000, Koo 2000). Along with, the 
bureaucracy, the police, and the military that sovereign South Korea inherited 
were essentially colonial creations (Chon et al. 2004; Kim 2004; Lim and Jang 
2006)8. In sum, this historical strand suggests that it might be likely that a 
significant part of the explanation for why countries pursue different 
developmental paths lies in their colonial heritage (Koo 1987: 134; Kohli 1999). 
 
The division of the Korean peninsula, brought into being by the Cold War and 
deepened by fratricidal conflict of the Korean War, was another reason for the 
establishment of strong state in South Korea. The division polarized political 
attitudes of Koreans and led to the emergence of powerful military and security 
establishments9 (Moon and Kim 1995; Cumings 1998, 1999; Kim and Lim 
2007).10 Moreover, the rise of anti-communism, which came with the division, 
cultivated a hegemonic ideology legitimizing the capitalist developmental 
trajectory (Kim 1992; Kim 1997, Kihl and Hayes 1997; KDI 1995).  Under the 
banner of anti-communism, powerful opposition leaders and groups were 
intimidated and fatally destroyed. In such political environment, authoritarian 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
7  The Chaebols are Korean conglomerates operating through a network of hierarchically organized equity ties 
controlled by a founding family (Lee and Han 2006: 309).  
8  Not only were state structures kept intact but the state’s capacity and willingness to direct economic 
change, as well as the economic instruments used by the state – for example, control over credit – 
continued from the colonial to the postcolonial period (Koo 1987: 129).  
9  Park Chung-Hee seized power by a military coup in 1960, and Chun Do Whan similarly came to power by a 
military coup in 1980.  
10  Bruce Cumings places a heavy emphasis on the external parameter: the central experience of Northeast 
Asia in this century has not been a realm of independence where autonomy and equality reigned, but with 
enmeshment in the hegemonic web. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have thus had states “strong” for the 
struggle to industrialize but “weak” because of the web of enmeshment: they are semi sovereign states 
(Cumings 1999: 92).  
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regimes could easily exclude most non-state actors from a role in the formation 
of national policy through a strategy of “political exclusion”(Kim 2001; Kim 
2003; Kang 2003). Bruce Cumings notes that Park’s regime penetrated civil 
society to forge new growth coalitions, while co-opting, controlling, or limiting 
potential opposition11. Especially, after the inauguration of the Yushin system, 
when the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) emerged as the preferred 
organization of order, and as an arm of the executive, the KCIA penetrated 
nearly every arena of Korean life, with agents in factories, central and local 
government offices, and university class rooms (Cumings 1987: 72). In addition, 
the keenly felt competition and threat from North Korea, which at that time was 
economically more advanced than the South all but forced a developmental 
orientation on the Park regime. 
 
South Korean economic development under non-democratic rule, moreover, can 
be attributed to its geopolitical merits, especially during the Cold War era when 
its development plans took start. It is inconceivable that South Korea could have 
succeeded in the absence of America’s willingness to throw open its markets to 
the export of Korean manufacturing products, and in the lack of the U.S. 
security umbrella, which has preserved the balance of power in the Korean 
peninsula and the East Asian region as well (Solomon 2005). The United States 
has since poured more than $13 billion in economic aid and military assistance 
into the country, and it still maintains approximately 29,500 troops there (Kim 
and Lim 2007: 71). Another aspect of the South Korean success is its utilization 
of the international environment. Peter Evans points out that Korea along with 
other East Asian NICs experienced a dramatic de-coupling of their economies 
from metropolitan capital; such as MNCs before their successful 
industrialization and furthermore, they did not reestablish ties until the process 
was well established. For example in 1967 the stock of direct foreign investment 
in Korea totaled only $78 million (Evans 1987: 206-7). By contrast, nowadays, 
foreign investment has exceeded the total of the previous 40 years. Foreign 
reserves increased from $3.9 billion at the end of 1997 to $74.0 billion at the end 
of 1999 (Pirie 2005; Lee et al. 2005: 26; Lee and Han 2006). Along with when 
the developmental strategy shifted to export oriented light industrialization in 
1963, the international economic situation was favorable to the Korean 
economy: since the 1960s advanced economies recorded relative abundance in 
international liquidity and over-production of capital goods, in general, and 
                                                          
11  The President was interpreted by constitutional scholars as the supreme leader who held not only neutral 
power for mediating functions of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches but also state 
power for determining the important matters of state affairs under the Yushin constitution. The presidential 
power under the Yushin system was understood as that of the supreme leader who had concentrated all 
political power of the state in the hands of the President himself. Park Chung Hee promulgated the 
Presidential Emergency Measure 9 for Safeguarding National Security and Public Order on May 13, 1975 
which prohibited any slandering of or challenges to the Yushin order. This measure was enforced 
vigorously till the death of Park in late 1979, when he was assassinated by the director of the Korean CIA 
(Lee 1990:.204). 
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machinery for light manufacturing, in particular (Shin and Chang 2003; Kim and 
Lim 2007).  
 
Another explanation for the South Korean economic success under dictatorship 
comes from the cultural argument. Confucianism is said to explain both the 
impressive economic performance and the maintenance of authoritarian rule in 
South Korea. Confucianism is a code of ethics to guide the relationship between 
human beings and has long influenced the mentality and behavior of the Korean 
people. Hierarchy is the core notion in the human relationships between 
generations, within families and between the ruler and the ruled. The duty of the 
subordinate is to show respect and loyalty, while the duty of the superior is to 
lead by asserting the highest moral and intellectual standards (Pye 1985; Lee 
1997; Koo and Nahm 1997). By justifying the existence of hierarchical political 
systems and the need for the centralized, meritocratic bureaucracy that operates 
within an authoritarian political tradition12, the Confucian value system 
generates particular institutional outcomes that are reflected in political system 
and in industrial organizations (Inglehart and Klingeman 2000; Huntington and 
Harrison 2000). Confucian emphasis on family, groups, norms, social harmony 
and moral, political and economic order have suffocated the development of 
political culture of individualism and personal freedom, and gave rise to 
“government by men” rather than “government by laws”. Good government has 
been less exemplified in popular views by the rule of impersonal law but 
understood more as an embodiment of virtuous leadership. These norms tend to 
offer greater “authority space” for governments attempts to regulate personal 
conduct and morality and to sanction corporate arrangements that promote 
compromises rather than rivalries among competing interests. Thus, supremacy 
of the state over societal forces seems to be based on such Confucian culture 
(Kihl 2005). Centralized state power which has played a leading role in 
mobilizing human and material resources necessary for rapid industrialization 
originated and could be maintained on the cultural foundation of Confucianism. 
Confucianism also places emphasis on hard work, diligence and a reverential 
attitude toward education, given that such traits are widely perceived to be the 
most acceptable means of career progression in a hierarchical system. This in 
turn implies that Confucianism encourages rapid human capital formation. In 
South Korea high demand for education matched with the economy’s demand 
for skilled manpower. Effective educational system and relatively high 
educational attainment of the South Korean population has produced skilled and 
semi-skilled labor force, which eventually has increased labor productivity and 
horizontal and vertical movement of the labor force (World Bank 1992: 192-
202). Ironically, however, it was also Confucian ethics that has been used to 
suppress labor and civil society (Koo 2000; Kim 2004; Kihl 2005). Chalmers 
                                                          
12  Peter Evans notes that in Korea the meritocratic civil service examination have been used for recruiting 
incumbents into the Korean state for over a thousand years (since A.D. 788) (Evans 1995: 51). 
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Johnson argues that Confucianism breeds a particular type of industrial 
organization, in which companies are organized in community-like, almost 
family-like ways, with a strong emphasis on team spirit (Johnson 1999: 60). 
 
In sum, legacies from Japanese colonial rule, the division of the Korean 
peninsula and the Korean War, the Cold War politics, American economic and 
military support, and Confucian ethics emphasizing hierarchy and authority all 
favorably acted to the emergence of a strong state with excessive power to take 
lead in economic developmental projects and in mobilizing the population 
according to this aim. Yet, this does not mean that these exogenous factors were 
the only critical elements for the rapid development under authoritarian rule. 
These factors cannot be more than contributory factors, which may play their 
part, but only when other conditions are favorable. Therefore, the exogenous 
factors – history, geopolitics, and culture – have provided circumstances for the 
emergence of the state relatively free from social pressure, which, in turn created 
a favorable policy environment.  
 
3.2. Endogenous Factor: Developmental State 
It is the developmental statist paradigm which has hold strong explanatory 
power over the economic success of South Korea under authoritarian regimes. 
Focus of this approach is placed on the state’s capacity and efficient role for 
macroeconomic intervention and mobilization of resources, its insulation from 
social pressures, policy consistency acquired from imposed political stability, 
and infusion of developmental ideology. Developmental statists postulate that 
economic success of South Korea is attributed to the active, interventionist state, 
which was able to formulate efficient, coherent, and consistent economic 
policies, and to implement them effectively (Shin and Chang 2003; Mo and 
Moon 2003; Lee and Han 2006). State planners, not the free markets, it is 
argued, determined the direction of economic activity and a complex system of 
financial directives, while conglomerates were used to achieve desired ends. In 
all major economic decisions, in short, the state dictated economic policies, 
while the large conglomerates executed them.13 
 
Chalmers Johnson notes that the state imposed strict controls on flows of 
investment funds and acted systematically to change the incentive structures of 
commodity markets in pursuit of national economic priorities. Through control 
of the banking system, the state not only controlled the allocation of investment 
capital, but also by setting favorable terms of interaction conducive to strategic 
                                                          
13  Linda Weiss notes due to the insulated policy-making, the government’s transformative project does not 
lose out to clientelistic or sectional interests; because of institutional connectedness, business does not lose 
out to remote and bumbling bureaucrats (Weiss 1998: 39). According to Shin and Chang (2003) this 
framework is better known as “Korea Inc.”. However, Korea Inc. may be a somewhat misleading label as it 
ignores more complicated or even conflict-ridden relationships among the business and governmental 
actors in specific historical situations (Lim and Jang 2006). 
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national goals it actively intervened to capture the potential benefits offered by 
foreign capital. And hence, Johnson presents a state centric perspective by 
placing the power tool in terms of finances in the hands of the state. It is clearly 
illustrated, when he notes a firm that does not respond as expected to particular 
incentives may find that its tax returns are subject to careful examination, or that 
its application for bank credit is studiously ignored, or that its outstanding bank 
loans are not renewed (Johnson 1987: 159). Such procedures were executed 
through an information-gathering network in the shape of a mandatory reporting 
system. This allowed the bureaucracy to keep close track of priority industries 
throughout the high-growth period. In return for significant state support, these 
industries were required regularly to report on their export performance and 
other areas of business activity (Shin and Chang 2003; Chang 2003; Chon et al. 
2004; Cherry 2005; Lim and Jang 2006). And hence, the credit tool was a strong 
measurement for the state to guide and select among industrial sectors (Pirie 
2005; 2007). Peter Evans illustrates with Korea’s Pohang Steel, how the 
interventionistic state could guide the industrial policy to expand to industrial 
fields where Korea did not possess natural comparative advantages. Such 
findings, however, conflict with findings in the World Bank’s widely published 
book The East Asian Miracle. It argued that industrial policy, defined as an 
attempt to achieve more rapid productivity growth by altering industrial 
structure, was generally unsuccessful. Instead, industrial growth in North East 
Asia was market conforming, and productivity growth was not significantly 
higher in promoted sectors (World Bank 1996: 308-16 & 325). 
 
Chalmers Johnson advocates, however, that sectoral selection does matter. And 
in line with this argument he dedicates financial control as the Korean 
developmental state’s strongest instrument to guide and accumulate the 
economy (Johnson 1987: 147). The advantage of the credit-based system was 
that the state could exert influence over the economy’s investment pattern and 
guide sectoral mobility, because in such a structure, firms relied on bank credit 
for raising finance beyond retained earnings, they therefore responded quickly to 
the state’s policy, as expressed in interest rate and other financial policies (Shin 
and Chang 2003; Weiss 2000, 2003; Lee and Han 2006). John Zysman employs 
similar assumption, when he claims a credit-based, price-administered financial 
system is a crucial enabling element. The financial system serves as the eyes and 
hands for the state’s industrial brain. This paper has taken the position that no 
matter what different scholars might conclude from their research, empirical 
data clearly shows that the Korean developmental state under Park Chung-hee’s 
reign heavily employed sectoral selection as an instrument to guide the 
economic development. In the aftermath of the Korean division, South Korea 
was cut off from the industrial base of heavy industry located in North Korea; 
inherited from the Japanese colonial period (Cumings 1981). But as shown in 
table 3.1 below, the industrial base was within two decades restructured so 
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heavy industry from a starting point of 28.6 per cent of the total industrial 
production exceeded light industry production in 1980 by reaching 51.2 per 
cent. Along with table 3.2 illustrates the selective industrial policy promotion 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The selectively promoted sectors were the 
heavy and chemical industries: iron and steel, metal products, machinery, 
electronics, and industrial chemicals. The motivation for these appears to be 
two-folded – to increase defense capability – and economic – to shift to capital- 
and technology-intensive sectors in anticipation of a loss of competitive 
advantage in labor-intensive sectors (KDI 1995; World Bank 1996; Haggard et 
al. 2003; Lee et al. 2005).  
 
Table 3.1 Heavy and Light Industrial 
Production: South Korea, 1960-1990 
 South Korea (%) 
 Heavy Light 
1962 28.6 71.4 
1965 31.4 68.6 
1970 38.1 61.9 
1975 45.9 54.1 
1980 51.2 48.8 
1985 56.7 43.3 
1990 59.3 40.7 
Source: KDI (1995) Economic Systems in South and North  
Korea 
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Table 3.2 Basic Policy Direction of South Korea (1960-1990)  
 Major policies Major indicators 
1960s • Export-oriented industrialization • Exports: $1billion (1970) 
 • Expansion of key industries and • Per capita GNP: $82 (1962), 
        Infrastructure        $289 (1971) 
  • Relative size of mfg. Sector: 
         17.0% (1966) 
   
1970s • Deepening of industrial • Exports: $10 billion (1977) 
        Structure through • Per Capita GNP: $1,000 (1977) 
        Promotion of heavy and • Relative size of mfg. sector: 
        Chemical industries        27.6% (1976) 
 • Formation of a basis  
        For self-reliant growth  
   
1980s • Economic stabilization • Tradevolume:$153billion (1991) 
 • Promotion of private • Per capita GNP: $6,498 (1991) 
        Initiatives and competition • Import liberalization rate 
 • Enhancement of social        (mfg.): 99.9% (1991) 
        Welfare and social equity  
 • Internationalization  
Source: KDI: Economic Systems in South and North Korea, p.47 
 
The state further influenced the structure of the economy by regulating the terms 
of interaction between industry and agriculture, by protecting infant industries, 
and by anticipating future needs in key sectors. In sum, the state was important 
in all facets of growth – diversification, stabilization and growth momentum. In 
the first phase, the state acted as an entrepreneur by planning and investing in 
new industries and sectors. It then deployed short-run stabilization policies to 
overcome external shocks and facilitated growth. Finally, government 
intervention insured the economy’s continued growth (Chon et al. 2004; Pirie 
2005; Lee and Han 2006). This economic efficacy is explained as a consequence 
of the policymakers’ insulation from contending societal and political pressures, 
and the organizational capacity and autonomy of the state. Chalmers Johnson 
observed that it was the authoritarian governance by a military-dominated single 
party regime that was instrumental not only in mobilizing and allocating 
financial resources, but also in disciplining civil society and suppressing 
political opposition (Jonhson 1999: 52-3; Kim 2004; Kihl 2005; Choi 2005).  
 
This insulation and autonomy of the state has created a political environment for 
policy consistency because economic conditions will not be measured in terms 
of electoral cycles. Reduced policy fluctuations have been more credible to 
economic agents and have improved economic outcomes. Stephan Haggard and 
Tun-jen Cheng elaborate the link between an authoritarian regime and 
developmental performance by stating that since authoritarian political 
arrangements give political elites autonomy from distributional pressure. They 
increase the government’s ability to extract resources, provide public goods and 
impose the short term costs associated with economic adjustments. In other 
 16
words, authoritarian rule has assisted the state to overcome the collective action 
dilemma by shielding the economic arena from the pressures of social and 
political groups.  The state ultimately guaranteed low costs of production and 
the repression of labor, farmers, and political opposition. Workers, who made 
the economic miracle, were forced to work long hours, under low wages, with 
little legal protection. Labor laws, which should have provided legal protection 
to workers, were instead used to suppress the labor. In particular, the banning of 
industrial unions, the prohibition of multiple unionism, the prohibition of third 
party mediation in industrial disputes (Haggard and Cheng 1987; Koo 2000; 
Moon and Yang 2002; Kang 2003; Chang and Chae 2004). In controlling civil 
society, the authoritarian regime relied on several instruments: legal instruments 
such as the National Security Law, the Social Safety Law, and the Law 
Concerning Collective Demonstrations; security and intelligence apparatus such 
as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the National Defense Security 
Command, and the police (Lee 1990: Moon and Kim 1995: 118; Choi 2005). 
State strength and autonomy, thus, were not achieved through consensual social 
pacts, but by harsh authoritarian rule of coercion, intimidation, and threats. The 
South Korean state was also effective in propagating developmental ideology. 
As Chalmers Johnson argues, an authoritarian regime can forge or impose a 
national ideology for hard work and sacrifice for economic development, and 
can obtain widespread acceptance of its ideology through policy measures such 
as mass education. The South Korean government infused the developmental 
ideology to the whole populace in order to facilitate economic growth and to 
avert attention from politics to mainly economic interests. In effect, the ideology 
of the South Korean state combined anti-communism, which in practice was 
both anti-labor and anti-democratic, with developmentalism, which appealed to 
nationalism. 
 
Hagen Koo (1987) claims that the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, finally 
ended the old agrarian elite of the Korean class structure. With the war’s end 
emerged a poor but a highly fluid and egalitarian society in South Korea. The 
labor movement in South Korea has, nonetheless, always been suspected of 
subversion and threat to national security because of the confrontation with 
socialist North Korea. Political circumstances resulting directly from national 
division have always provided authoritarian regimes with the rationale to 
suppress labor unrest; the national security state cannot take the political risks 
associated with an independent labor movement (Kim and Moon 2000; 
Buchanan and Nichols 2003; Baccaro and Lim 2007). The situation of political 
opposition and civil society was not much different. Opposition groups and 
leaders were systematically repressed and the popular sector was excluded from 
the political processes (Choi 2005; Kihl 2005). The division of Korea and 
confrontation with the North has further provided a constant source of regime 
legitimacy to the dictatorial regimes. For example, Park’s illegitimate way of 
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coming to power via military coup and the regime’s continued suppression of 
political freedom have been justified in the name of national security and 
political stability needed for economic development. However, such insulation, 
autonomy and coherent policy capacity could not be realized without political 
repression against people. It was democracy that has been the greatest sacrifice 
of the South Korean economic success before the democratic turn in 1987.  
 
The good news is announced to be that popular acceptance of repression is 
likely to decline as development comes closer to a society’s reach, which in turn 
is likely to lead to a serious legitimation crisis. No country in human history has 
ever achieved enduring stability by oppression. This implies that prolonged 
authoritarian rules prove costly and insensitive to the demands of an 
increasingly complex society and require tremendous cost and effort to prevent 
popular uprising or opposition coalitions from rising (Donnely 1989: 197). 
Applied to the Korean case, while South Korea has indeed achieved rapid 
growth, social contradictions inherent in the industrialization process have 
generated significant and growing opposition to the development model 
responsible for producing this growth. The authoritarian regime14 in South Korea 
lost its legitimacy as economic success caused a fundamental shift in value 
priorities from materialism to post-materialism (Inglehart 2000; Inglehart and 
Klingeman 2000). Unable to meet new demands for political freedom and 
participation, the regime could no longer justify its existence. The strengthening 
of civil society is the second domestic factor, which helped remove the 
authoritarians from office. At the societal level, economic development, 
industrialization, and urbanization have worked together to create and strengthen 
the wish of democratic restoration among the Korean populace (Kim 2001; S.H. 
Kim 2003; H.R. Kim 2004, Choi 2005). The triple solidarity of students, 
workers, and religious leaders expanded further to include the middle-class 
citizens in the democracy uprising of June 1987 (Kim and Lim 2007: 74). The 
developmental performance under park and Chun regimes, thus reveals the 
paradox of developmental dictatorship; while authoritarian rule was instrumental 
for regime survival and economic growth, the very process of development 
hastened the collapse of the regime itself. 
 
                                                          
14  Authoritarian regime has been the general rule of governance in South Korea throughout its life span. The 
1st Republic (1948-1960) headed by Syngman Rhee quickly turned into authoritarian and technocratic rule. 
Hereinafter a military coup replaced a “democratic” civilian rule on May 16, 1961, headed by Park Chung-
hee; president of the 3rd and the 4th Republics (1961-1979). A provisional installed civilian government in 
the aftermath of Park’s sudden assassination was overthrowned by a new military coup, headed by Chun 
Do-whan, and the subsequent establishment of the 5th Republic (1980-1987) on May 18, 1980. For further 
information see Shin (1994). 
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IV. The Financial Crisis of 1997 in Retrospect 
 
4.1 The Replacement of the Developmental State with a Neo-liberal Agenda 
When the financial crisis hit Korea, the economic recession of 1998-1998 was 
regarded by its citizens as the worst crisis since the Korean War. 15 The nation’s 
foreign exchange reserve was nearly depleted, and the Korean government was 
finally forced to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on November 21 
1997 to provide emergency loans to address the nation’s liquidity problem. On 
December 3, Korea and the IMF signed a three-year Stand-By Arrangement 
totaling US$74 billion, the largest rescue package in the history of IMF at the 
time (Lee and Han 2006: 306-7). The IMF program for Korea was classic IMF 
austerity. It called for tight fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize the currency, 
thereby stemming the outflow of foreign currency and fixing the nation’s current 
account imbalance (IMF 2002, 2003). As a result, the Korean won (KRW), 
which depreciated to 1700 per dollar in January 1998 from the pre-crisis level of 
900 KRW, stabilized to the 1300 level by the middle of 1998. However, this was 
achieved by an aggressive high interest rate policy, which raised Korea’s 
nominal interest rate to as high as 30 per cent, a policy, which threw the already 
fragile economy into its worst recession in nearly 20 years (Lee and Han 2006: 
307; Pirie 2005, 2007). The GDP growth rate in Korea thus plummeted from the 
pre-crisis average of 7 per cent to -6.7 per cent in 1998, while the inflation rate 
rose from 4.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent (Kim and Moon 2000; Koo 2000; Lee and 
Rhee 2002: 539). The good employment record also came to a halt. For the last 
two decades, Korea has enjoyed virtually full employment prior to the crisis. 
The unemployment rates were remarkably low, at less than three per cent during 
the 1990s. The unemployment rate grew, however, drastically after the crisis 
from 2.6 per cent in 1997 to 6.8 per cent in 1998. At the peak, the 
unemployment rate soared to 8.8 per cent in February 1998 (Lee and Rhee 2002: 
550). The absolute numbers provide a more dramatic picture. At the end of 
1997, the number of unemployed stood at roughly 420,000. By June 1998, that 
number reached 1.41 million or a loss of nearly one million jobs in just six 
months. Most strikingly, the majority of the lost jobs were considered white 
collar, an unthinkable phenomenon in a culture based on Japanese style life-long 
employment (Koo 2000; Moon and Yang 2002; Lee and Han 2006: 307). 
 
The general consensus appears to be that the internal cause of the crisis is 
attributed to: (i) Korea’s weak financial sector which had severely limited 
capability to assess risk16; and (ii) an over-leveraged corporate sector with 
                                                          
 
15  The financial crisis began in Thailand in July 1997 and spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, and finally Korea by 
the end of the year. 
16  In the aftermath, the restructuring of the finance sector has carried with it considerable fiscal costs and total 
government spending on the program amounts to well in excess of 16 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (OECD 2004: 19). 
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insufficient attention to profitability. These to causes left the Korean economy 
dangerously exposed to external shocks (Cherry 2005; Pirie 2005, 2007; Lee and 
Han 2006). In particular, the public legitimacy of chaebols was largely shattered, 
when long-term opposition leader Kim Dae Jung and his political party took 
power in 1998, because the chaebols were considered to have colluded with past 
authoritarian governments and conservative ruling parties for their own benefit 
(Choi 2005; Kihl 2005; Lim and Jang 2006: 445).17 The Korean developmental 
state experience has thus contributed to an extreme market concentration of 
economic wealth in the shape of the chaebols. On the eve of the crisis, the top 
thirty chaebols held a commanding position in the Korean economy, accounting 
for 46.3 per cent of total assets, 45.9 per cent of total sales, 13.1 per cent of total 
value-added, and 4.2 per cent of total employment (Shin and Chang 2003: 32). 
Within this elite group, the top five conglomerates (Daewoo, Hyundai, LG, 
Samsung, and SK) took a 29.9 per cent share of total assets, 32.2 per cent of 
sales, 8.5 per cent of value-added and 2.7 per cent of employment. And even 
strong advocators of an interventionistic state, such as Linda Weiss (2000, 2003) 
and Peter Evans (1995) admit that in the Korean case, the market concentration 
of power in a few hands of big players might hurt the efficiency of reforms, 
which seems to be an inevitable necessity to cope with market restructuring in 
order to maintain future growth. Add to this that the chaebol were also 
responsible for a substantial proportion of the nation’s debt: 47.9 per cent for the 
top thirty business groups and 29.8 per cent for the top five (Shin and Chang 
2003; Mo and Moon 2003; Cherry 2005: 328).18 As a result, for the recovery and 
future growth of the Korean economy it became a widely-shared understanding 
that economic recovery was inconceivable without radical reform of the 
chaebols (Mo and Moon 2003: 127). The rationale behind these transactions, 
which came to be known as the “Big Deals”, was that Korea’s business groups 
had to trim their operations, focus on a small number of core businesses, and 
enhance their international competitiveness in order to survive the crisis and 
compete with multinational firms in the domestic and global markets (Stiglitz 
1999; Yun 2003; Lee et al. 2005).  
 
In the wake of the crisis, the state has thus demonstrated an unprecedented 
determination to force leading conglomerates to restructure and improve 
profitability, a willingness to allow major strategically important firms to fail, 
and has actively promoted the sale of key assets to foreign investors (Pirie 2005: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
17  Both the Kim government and the IMF shared a diagnosis that one of the most serious causes of the 1997 
crisis had been Chaebols’ over expansion, mismanagement, and inefficiency during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Chon et al. 2004: 27). 
18  The average debt-equity ratio of the chaebols rose to 4.4 per cent by 1997, almost twice as high as that on 
non-chaebol corporations (IMF Country Report 2002: 87).  
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356).19 On this occasion, it is remarkable that within just three years, the share of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to Korea in terms of total GNP had tripled, from 
2.6 per cent to 7.8 per cent between 1996 and 1999. Furthermore, foreign 
investors now account for more than 40 per cent of total shares listed in the 
Korean stock market, and a number of MNC’s have taken over the management 
of high profile business, once considered exclusively Korean (OECD 1999, 
2004). Since the South Korean financial crisis was a direct consequence of 
foreign debt problems and speculative capital, FDI began to be seen as a positive 
alternative source of foreign capital. First, in contrast to short-term debt, FDI 
was viewed as longer-term, non-speculative and thus less likely to deplete the 
nation’s foreign reserves. Second, a large presence of foreign businesses would 
be beneficial to maintaining the nation’s credit rating among international 
lenders. Third, FDI brings in more advanced forms of business management and 
practices (Lee and Han 2006: 315; Pirie 2007). Lee and Han argue that among 
all the reform measures undertaken in response to the financial crisis, it is the 
policy changes affecting foreign investment that produced what amounts to a 
paradigm shift in Korea’s well-known model of developmental state (Lee and 
Han 2006: 306). In effect, the process of creating a more open and transparent 
economy inevitably weakens the government’s ability to use tools such as credit 
control, resource allocation, incentives and subsidies to achieve its 
developmental goals and it thus means a reduction in the degree of state 
intervention in economic activity (Cumings 1998; Cherry 2005; Pirie 2005, 
2007). By way of example, by the end of 2000, foreign ownership in 
commercial banks reached 32 per cent, almost in parity to 37 per cent of 
government ownership (Lee and Han 2006: 319). State intervention in economic 
activity also contrasts sharply with the ideals of neoliberalism, which 
emphasizes the supremacy of market forces and the need for deregulation and 
liberalization of economic activity. To some observers the process of market 
restructuring has replaced the traditional developmental state with a 
“transformative state” model. According to this theoretical strand, the 
“transformative state” has incorporated a “more mature version of 
developmentalism” where the goal has changed from one of “catching up” to 
one of upgrading the industrial economy, and where the government plays the 
role of “senior partner” rather than “commander-in-chief” (Haggard et al. 1999; 
Weiss 2000: 28-9, 2003: 249). 
 
Critics charge, however, that the transnationalization of corporate ownership and 
heightened emphasis on shareholder value has negative effects on the stability of 
social cohesion and employment. In line with this, another approach to 
                                                          
19  In terms of market capitalization, the proportion of foreign-owned shares in all companies listed in the 
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE, recently changed into Korea Exchange) increased from 13% in 1996 to 
41.97% in 2004 (Lim and Jang 2006: 452).  
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understanding the post-crisis restructuring process is that advanced by the left-
Keynesians (Shin and Chang 2003; Lee and Han 2006; Lim and Jang 2006). For 
these scholars rather than creating the conditions for Korea to continue its 
historic economic ascent, these policies were doomed to fail and has instead 
locked Korea into a low-investment/low-growth trajectory. In sum, neo-liberal 
reform is conceived as authoritarian and exclusive, because it increases 
inequality and poverty in society by repressing or distorting the majority of 
people’s demand for socio-economic rights and well-being, while 
disproportionately benefiting the “haves” with financial assets and capital via 
such policy measures as deregulation, liberalization, privatization and labor 
flexibility (Lim and Jang 2006: 448). Suffice it to say that the neoliberal turn is 
heavily pronounced by the transnationalization of corporate ownership and 
heightened emphasis on shareholder value, which are well-known mechanisms 
to enforce labor flexibility, hand in hand with an increased insecurity in people’s 
life with regard to social safety.20 As a result, the income gap between the rich 
and the poor has increased along with post-crisis neo-liberal reforms. The Gini 
Index which describes the situation of wealth distribution is useful here.21 The 
Gini Index for “market income” increased from 0.302 in 1996 to 0.374 in 2000. 
The Gini index for “disposable income” also increased from 0.298 in 1996 to 
0.358 in 2000. Both show an increase in income inequality during the period, 
even after augmented public welfare intervention. Especially, the increased 
inequality in disposable income means that Korea had the third worst rating of 
OECD member countries, after Mexico (0.494) in 1998 and the US (0.368) in 
2000 (Lim and Jang 2006: 455). 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
It has been the developmental statist paradigm which has hold strong 
explanatory power over the economic success of South Korea under 
authoritarian regimes. The paper has illuminated that the state has played a 
critical role in macroeconomic intervention and in mobilizing the whole society 
to achieve developmental goals. However, it has not been the state alone, but 
exogenous factors such as history, geopolitics, and culture, too, that has shaped 
the character of the Korean state and its economic performance. This suggests 
that there is no necessary relationship between democracy and development nor, 
more generally, between any regime type and economic performance, for the 
simple reason that different regimes have different capabilities, historical 
records, and cultural settings and the developmental outcomes of each regime 
may vary. Against this context-based interpretation, modernization theorists 
                                                          
20  In 2004, South Korea was ranked as 12th among 28 OECD countries in a survey that assessed labour 
flexibility showing that the conventional media representation of labour rigidity in the country was a myth 
(Lim and Jang 2006: 454).  
21  According to the Gini Index 0 is most equal, whereas 1 is most unequal. 
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have argued that democratic development is an evolutionary phenomenon 
resulting from economic development. The argument is relevant on the point 
that economic growth brings together changes in the overall socio-economic 
structure of society and the forces emerging from this transformation favor 
democratic governance. Yet, strong state with coherent policy capacity and 
insulation from societal pressures could not be realized without political 
repression against people. It was democracy that has been the greatest sacrifice 
of the South Korean economic success before the democratic turn in 1987.  
 
The consolidation of democracy in South Korea seems to have become further 
complicated and constrained by the financial crisis of 1997. As briefly illustrated 
above, the decades-long struggle for democratic restoration in South Korea has 
been hijacked by neo-liberal reforms. These reforms have been presented by the 
political establishment as anti-authoritarian and anti-Chaebol “democracy” 
based on market principles. This neoliberal turn has occurred within a few short 
years in which foreign capital has become an integral part of Korea’s new 
growth strategy. It was shown that the direction of structural reforms gave 
transnational capital and foreign businesses crucial advantages and more leeway, 
while domestic firms and financial institutions were forced to rapidly downsize 
into bankruptcy, which, in turn, heightened both social unrest and social 
instability. As a result, the “relative poverty ratio” of households, which 
indicates the proportion of the households whose disposable income amounts to 
less than 40 per cent of the medium income of all households, increased from 
7.7 per cent in 1996 to 11.5 per cent in 2000. With intensified neo-liberal 
reforms after the 1997 crisis, the relative poverty ratio of households in South 
Korea nearly reached almost the US level in 2000, which was one of the highest 
among OECD countries. And what seems even more crucial by conceiving 
economic development as a mean to improve the inhabitants’ livelihood, is the 
tendency of economic inequality to correlate negatively with political 
opportunity. Robert Dahl can be quoted for economic inequalities’ tendency to 
spill over into the political domain and thereby constraining the very nature of a 
democracy:  
 
“Ownership and control contribute to the creation of great differences among 
the citizens in wealth, income, status, information, control over information 
and propaganda, access to political leaders, and, on the average, predictable 
life chances […] After all due qualifications have been made, differences like 
these help in turn to generate significant inequalities among the citizens in 
their capacities and opportunities for participating as political equal in 
governing the state” (Dahl 1985: 55).  
 
Though transformed to the newly born democracy in South Korea, the strategy 
of unbalanced growth based heavily on pure market principles hurt the social 
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integration of South Korean society and thus maintains the division within social 
classes, sectors, and regions.  
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